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INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE RATE-MAIUNG:
THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE
BEN AVON DOCTRINE
LESLIE A. GLTCK*

I. INTRODUCTION

IT has been over fifty years since the Supreme Court of the 1United States
decided Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough. Throughout

this period the case has stood, with varying degrees of fortitude, for the
proposition that public utilities are entitled to independent judicial review of tariffs fixed by administrative rate-making bodies. The rule, based
on the notion that constitutional due process requires the sanctity of de
novo court review prior to any "taking" of property from a utility, is at
best a dubious one. Yet more pernicious than the rule itself has been the
uncertainty surrounding it. Various scholars and courts, viewing the case
law both prior and subsequent to Ben Avon, have taken the position that
it is no longer good law. It is the purpose of this article to take a long
and, hopefully, final look at the life of the Ben Avon rule, with a view
toward hastening its interment.
The Ben Avon case arose out of an investigation by the Public Service
Commission of Pennsylvania, acting upon a complaint that the Ohio
Valley Water Company had been charging excessive rates. The company,
dissatisfied with the determination and concomitant rate reduction issued
by the Commission, appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which
reversed the order and directed that rates sufficient to yield a seven percent return be authorized. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed,
primarily on the ground that the courts did not have the power "to determine the question of confiscation according to their own independent
judgment when the action of the Commission comes to be considered on
appeal."1 The United States Supreme Court, in a virtually unprecedented
decision, disagreed. The Court held:
[I]f the owner claims confiscation of his property will result, the State must provide
a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determination
* Member of the New York and Washington, D.C. bars; B3., Cornell University; J.D.,
Cornell Law School; Former Confidential Law Assistant to the Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, Third Department; Associated with the firm of Graubard, Moskovitz & McCauley,
Washington, D.C.
1.
2.

253 U.S. 287 (1920).
Id. at 289.
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upon its own independent judgment as to both law and facts; otherwise the order is
void because in conflict with the due process clause, Fourteenth Amendment,8
The import of the Ben Avon decision is quite clear. It provides a public
utility with a second chance to obtain a rate increase or challenge a rate
reduction after the matter has been finally passed upon by the administrative or quasi-legislative body charged with the duty to fix such rates.
Such a de novo trial literally wipes the slate clean and theoretically enables the utility to proceed as if no prior determination had been made.
The patently undesirable effect of this rule is to undermine the finality
and authority of administrative rate-making by permitting utilities to
entirely ignore such rates by crying "confiscation" and seeking judicial
review. The courts are then faced with the onerous task of sifting through
volumes of economic data and generally contradictory expert testimony
without the refined expertise of the specialists who sit on public service
commissions and attempting to arrive at a more enlightened judgment
than the administrative body that has already undertaken the task. Not
only does this tend to unnecessarily burden our already overworked trial
courts, but it also tends to decrease the quality of the determination by
imposing a Herculean task on trial court judges, many of whom are
simply not up to it.
If the inherent unsoundness of the rule were not bad enough by itself,
the problem has become even more complex due to the uncertainty that
surrounds its very existence. There are many court-created rules which
are unfortunate, but somehow the courts and the bar learn how to both
live with and, on occasion, circumvent them. However, when there is
widespread doubt as to whether a rule exists at all, the result is often
disastrous. Certainty, it must be admitted, is as important to our legal
system as justice, and when there is doubt as to what the law is we often
find a plethora of inconsistent court rulings. This is exactly what has resulted during the fifty years since the birth of Ben Avon. The Supreme
Court, after stating the rule, has never seen fit to follow or specifically
reaffirm it without some modification, thus leading many to believe that
the case has been overruled sub silentio. 4 Moreover, the Ben Avon case
3. Id. (citations omitted). Note, however, the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurred
in by Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Clarke, which indicated that review should be
limited to the substantial evidence test. Id. at 298 (dissenting opinion).
4. The Ben Avon case was intended to apply only to review of administrative bodies
exercising a legislative function, e.g., rate-making, as compared to those exercising a
judicial or quasi-judicial function. However, the Supreme Court extended the doctrine to
quasi-judicial orders with respect to facts relating to constitutional issues in Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). To discuss the implications and vitality of Crowell In this
article would be at best collateral. It is sufficient to note that that case, like Ben Avon, has
been narrowly construed and repeatedly distinguished so as to cause considerable doubt as
to its present authority. See Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact,
70 Harv. L. Rev. 953, 973 (1957).
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itself was a departure from previous rulings wherein the review of ratefixing orders was limited to the substantial evidence test.'
The only case which may be said to have indicated a continued reliance
on Ben Avon was St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,' and even
there the Supreme Court made a substantial retreat from the bold implications of Ben Avon. In this case the Court indicated that courts were not
empowered to make a truly independent determination but must be guided
by the " ' strong presumption in favor of the conclusions reached by an
experienced administrative body after a full hearing.' ,,7
This, it may be
argued, is little more than the substantial evidence test in disguise.8 Since
the St. Joseph's case the Supreme Court has failed to apply the Ben Avon
doctrine in many appropriate cases and has indicated a reversion to the
pre-Ben Avon approach. Moreover, the Court has denied certiorari in
the face of a circuit court ruling that the courts may not substitute their
judgment for that of rate-making bodies.10
The result of all this is that the Ben Avon doctrine has become something of a Frankenstein monster, lying in its crypt, only to be sporadically
S. "[Clourts will not examine the facts further than to determine whether there was
substantial evidence to sustain the order." ICC v. Union P.R.R., 222 U.S. 541, 548 (1911).
6. 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
7. Id. at 53, citing Darnell v. Edwards, 244 U.S. 564, 569 (1917). See also the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis where he indicated that leaving the "final ascertainment of the facts" to administrative bodies had been held consistent with the Constitution
in numerous areas, e.g., eminent domain, taxation, customs duties, and insurance valuation.
298 U.S. at 78-80.
8. See 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 29.09 (1958).
9. E.g., FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942) ("Once a fair hearing
has been given, proper findings made and other statutory requirements satisfied, the courts
cannot intervene in the absence of a clear showing that the limits of due process have been
overstepped. If the Commission's order, as applied to the facts before it and viewed in its
entirety, produces no arbitrary result, our inquiry is at an end."); Railroad Comm'n v.
Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 581 (1940) ("[Clourts must not substitute their
notions of expediency and fairness for those which have guided the agencies to whom the
formulation and execution of policy have been entrusted.") ; see FPC v. Hope Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591, 602 (1944), which had the effect of limiting the areas in which any "independent
judgment" could be exercised and indicated that Commission rates carried "a presumption
of validity." Since a court cannot exercise a truly independent judgment where a presumption of validity is involved, one must conclude that Ben Avon is considerably diluted by the
Hope Gas decision. See also Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341
(1951). Probably the most recent decision on this point is to be found in the Permian
Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968) ("[Tihe Natural Gas Act provides without
qualification that the 'finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive.' More important, we have heretofore emphasized that Congress
has entrusted the regulation of the natural gas industry to the informed judgment of the
Commission, and not to the preferences of reviewing courts.").
10. Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. FPC, 329 U.S. 773 (1946), denying cert. to 155 F2d 694
(10th Cir.).
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resurrected. The state courts refer to it as a "dubious" or "discredited"
doctrine but often apply it nonetheless, indicating their preference for
letting the Supreme Court undo what it has created. Thus, the shadow
of Ben Avon is perhaps more powerful than its substance. The resulting
confusion is obviously undesirable and has had a deleterious effect on the
finality and respect accorded to administrative and quasi-legislative ratemaking proceedings. The time has come to finally bury Ben Avon. If this
proves impossible, then it should at least be disregarded by the state courts
as being little more than the fossilized remains of a once vital doctrine.

II. TE NiEw YORx

APPROACH

The task of proving that a specific case has been implicitly overruled
is not a simple one. It is the kind of topic about which reasonable men
can often differ. However, if one were to hold an inquest into the suspected
demise of Ben Avon, it would be found that most commentators have pronounced it dead, or at least dying." More importantly, the courts have
also adopted this posture with increasing frequency. A decision of great
importance is the recent New York Court of Appeals decision in Mount
2 Judge Breitel, writing for the court,
St. Mary's Hospital v. Catherwood.1
stated that "in [New York], the Ben Avon doctrine was once accepted
and applied in a utility rate case."' This choice of language clearly
implies that the doctrine is no longer accepted in New York. The use of
the past tense may be construed as being equivalent to a statement by the
court that "we no longer apply the Ben Avon doctrine in New York."
Moreover, Judge Breitel made it clear that he was following what the
court perceived to be the trend of judicial decisions when he noted that,
"[a]lthough never overruled, this requirement of de novo review has
evidently ebbed in the Federal courts, leaving as a residuum the substantial evidence test."' 4 Since this is the most direct expression of the
New York Court of Appeals on this question, it is at least an indication
that the court might no longer follow its earlier holding in Staten Island
11. Professor Davis, perhaps the foremost authority on administrative law, has flatly
stated that the "Ben Avon doctrine in the federal courts is dead." 4 K. Davis, supra note
8, § 29.09, at 174; see Benjamin, Judicial Review of Administrative Adjudication: Some
Recent Decisions of the New York Court of Appeals, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 30 (1948); 3
B.C. Ind. & Comm. L. Rev. 554, 556 (1962). See also 1 R. Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York 344 (1942). Some authors, however, believe that the
Ben Avon doctrine still has some vitality. See Jaffe, supra note 4, at 984; Strong, The
Persistent Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact", 46 N.C.L. Rev. 223 (1968).
12. 26 N.Y.2d 493, 260 N.E.2d 508, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1970).
13. Id. at 504, 260 N.E.2d at 514, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 871 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
14. Id. at 503-04, 260 N.E.2d at 513, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 870 (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted).
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Edison Corp. v. Maltbie.1 In that case the court of appeals, relying
heavily on Ben Avon, held that a utility might bring an action for injunctive relief where an article 78 proceeding would not adequately protect the utility's constitutional rights. Petitioner's theory in Staten Island,
accepted by the majority of the court of appeals, was that the standard
for review by way of certiorari was inadequate since no new trial and
no new findings of fact would be possible but only a limited review based
on the substantiality of the evidence. Judge Desmond, in a dissenting
opinion in which he was joined by Judges Loughran and Fuld, noted:
[P]laintiff has successfully maintained herein that, having adequately alleged unconstitutional confiscation of its property, its absolute right to procedural due process
can be satisfied by nothing less than a separate, independent trial de novo by a court,
of the same questions already litigated at length before the commission. If that be
the law, a good many long, involved rate cases will have to have two trials each, and
the first trial-before the commission-will be rather a footless and futile performance. 16

While it would seem that the Mount St. Mary's case has overruled Staten
Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, at least by implication, it would of course
be more desirable, in terms of judicial certainty, for the court to directly
abandon its old approach. Such an opportunity arose in the case of New
York Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission,17 in which the appellate division indicated that Ben Avon was discredited and need not
be followed. The court of appeals, while modifying the decision, did not
criticize or reverse the appellate division on this point, thus indicating its
tacit approval. Since New York Telephone provides an interesting model
of the type of case in which the Ben Avon rule is often applied, it is discussed below in some detail.
Ill. THE NE W YORK TELEPHONE ComPANY CASE
On March 20, 1969, the New York Telephone Company (NYT) filed
with the New York Public Service Commission (PSC) proposed rate
adjustments which, if accepted, would have increased its annual revenues
by approximately $175,000,000.18 In applying for this increase, the company submitted abundant financial data relating to its earnings and expenses for the 1968 fiscal year, which was designated as the test year.
This data, according to the company, indicated that existing rates were
too low to supply the necessary revenues for a "fair rate of return."
15. 296 N.Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705 (1947).
16. Id. at 385, 73 N.E.2d at 709-10 (dissenting opinion).
17. 64 Misc. 2d 485, 315 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct. 1970), rev'd, 36 App. Div. 2d 261, 320
N.Y.S.2d 280 (3d Dep't), modified per curiam, 29 N.Y.2d 164, 272 N.E.2d 554, 324 N.Y.S.2d
53 (1971).

18.

New York Tel. Co., Case 25155, at 3 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, July 1, 1970).
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Law,10

Pursuant to section 92 of the Public Service
the proposed rate
increase was suspended pending hearings by the PSC as to the necessity
and reasonableness of the request. This was the inception of case 25155
before the Commission. Hearings were held for some 33 days and appearances were made by 71 persons representing such diverse interests as the
PSC, the telephone company, the National Fire & Burglar Alarm Association, The Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, and the Consumer
Information Service. Numerous individual protestants also appeared;
5,275 pages of testimony were taken. On January 20, 1970, Commissioner
Larken, who presided at the hearings, submitted to the Commission, his
proposed report in which he recommended a rate increase which would
yield $136,756,000 in additional revenues, substantially less than the increase sought by the company. 0 The Commission agreed that the original
amount sought by the company was unreasonable and excessive and
cancelled the proposed tariff. While the Commission did not adopt
Larken's recommendation that an increase of $136,756,000 be granted, it
did acknowledge that some increase was justified and indicated that it
would entertain a new filing for an amount not exceeding that recommended by Commissioner Larken, and that such a filing might be made
effective on an interim basis pending final determination. The company
made a new filing and the interim rate went into effect on February 26,
1970.21 After three months' experience with these new interim rates, NYT
apparently discovered that the new rate of return fell short of its anticipations, and that the interim rate for which it had applied was in fact
confiscatory. On June 16, 1970, the company filed a petition to reopen the
record. In this petition the company claimed that it would need an additional $155,000,000 per year in revenues to earn a rate of return of 7.88
percent, supposedly an agreed-upon rate of "reasonable return."
On July 1, 1970, the petition to reopen the record was denied. 2 Moreover, the Commission issued its final order fixing rates which would yield
additional revenues of only $104,965,000 annually23 and directed the
company to refund to its customers the excess collected under the interim
rate.24

On September 1, 1970, the Commission issued its opinion on the motion
to reopen the proceeding and, by a 3-2 decision, denied a rehearing. However, an adjustment of approximately $15,000,000 was made so as to
19. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 92 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
20. New York Tel Co., Case 25155, at 4-5 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, July 1, 1970).

21.

Id.

22.

Order, New York Tel. Co., Case 25155, at 3 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, July 1,

1970).
23.
24.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
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allow NYT to file for new rates yielding $120,797,000. In denying the
motion to reopen the proceeding the Commission noted:
If NYT believes that its rates are inadequate it should file promptly for whatever relief it believes it can justify under the changed conditions. Administrative proceedings
25
must come to an end.... Reopening of this proceeding is not a sensible alternative.
Two Commissioners, dissenting, favored a reopening of the proceeding
but with no rate increase until the evidence was reviewed.
It was at this point that proceedings at special term 2 were instituted
by NYT. The company simultaneously brought an equitable action to
enjoin the Commission from interfering with the company's original proposed rate increase coupled with a proceeding in the nature of certiorari
under article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules to review
the actions of the PSC. A stay delaying the effective date of the Commission's final order reducing the rates was also requested and granted.
On November 3, 1970, Judge Kane of the supreme court handed down
his decision granting the preliminary injunction,2 7 relying on the Ben
Avon and Staten Island cases and exercising his independent judgment on
both the facts and the law. Judge Kane apparently had some reservations
concerning the continuing vitality of the Ben Avon rule and noted that
" [t]his Court of Appeals decision [Staten IslandEdison Corp. v. Maltbie]
has never been overruled although the once accepted doctrine upon which
it was based... has been cast in doubt."28 The court also noted that the
recent court of appeals decision in the Mount St. Mary's case spoke of the
cc'now dubious rule in the Ben Avon and Staten Island cases',"' " but concluded that
the doubt cast cannot be considered tantamount to an overruling of the law of that
case.

Furthermore, if the Staten Island case is to be overruled, it should be done by the
Court of Appeals and not by this court.30
Thus, Judge Kane cautiously adhered to the decaying Ben Avon doctrine,
leaving the constitutional question to be decided by the higher courts.
25. New York Tel. Co., Case 25155, at 15 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Sept. 1, 1970)
(citation omitted).
26 64 Misc. 2d 485, 315 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct. 1970), rev'd, 36 App. Div. 2d 261,
320 N.Y.S.2d 280 (3d Dep't), modified per curiam, 29 N.Y.2d 164, 272 N.E.2d 554, 324
N.Y.S.2d 53 (1971).
27. The article 78 proceeding was transferred directly to the appellate division pursuant
to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7804(g) (McKinney 1963).
28. 64 Misc. 2d at 488, 315 N.Y.S.2d at 329 (citations omitted).
29. Id., citing Mount St. Mary's Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 509, 260 N.E2d
508, 517, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863, 875 (1970).
30. 64 Misc. 2d at 488-89, 315 N.YS.2d at 330 (citations omitted).
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On appeal, the appellate division reversed, and in doing so flatly rejected
the Ben Avon doctrine.3'
The court of appeals, although modifying the decision on the merits,
left intact the appellate division's finding that judicial review should be
limited to the narrow scope of article 78 of the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules. The decision represents a new awareness by the state
appellate courts that the Ben Avon doctrine can no longer be swept under
the carpet, but must be dealt with forthrightly. The New York Telephone
case itself is a classic. It graphically illustrates the pernicious effects of
the Ben Avon rule. A complex rate determination was made by the Public
Service Commission, a body possessed of great expertise which has been
entrusted by the legislature with the power to balance the needs of the
utilities against those of the public. Thirty-three days of hearings were
held, 5,275 pages of testimony were elicited, and then, after an analysis
of countless pages of statistics and economic data, a decision was reached.
If the decision were favorable to the utility, the matter might well have
ended there. However, should the utility be dissatisfied, as in this case,
they need only cry "confiscation" and proceed to obtain another determination of the question de novo under the guise of constitutional due
process. The result is that a lone judge must substitute his independent
judgment on both questions of fact and law for that of the members of the
Public Service Commission.
Of course, there must be some judicial review of quasi-legislative ratemaking to insure against arbitrary action. However, the existing procedures for limited review that exist in the majority of jurisdictions
are sufficient to prevent abuses. Such review is generally limited to the
"substantial evidence test" and permits the courts to scrutinize the ad31. The appellate division, following the approach recommended in this article, reversed
the injunction issued by the trial court, New York Telephone Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
36 App. Div. 2d 261, 320 N.Y.S.2d 280 (3d Dep't 1971). In a notable and couragcous
decision, Judge Simons, writing for the court, observed that "there are sound and persuasive reasons" for not following Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltble, decided by the
court of appeals in 1947. Id. at 265, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 284. He noted that "[tjhe holding of
Staten Island was necessitated by strict adherence to the Supreme Court's rule in the Ben
Avon case decided in 1920, a rule which that court itself has all but ignored and which It
has cited only once in a rate case since it was handed down." Id. (italics omitted) Judge
Simons observed that the courts seem to have come "full circle" from a pre-Ben Avon rule,
requiring only limited review by certiorari in rate cases. He noted that "[recent Supreme
Court holdings are more consistent with these decisions than with the Ben Avon case." Id.
at 267, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 286 (italics omitted). In discussing the important policy reasons
for eliminating the Ben Avon rule, Judge Simons concluded: "The time consumed, the
expense involved, the cumbersome procedures, and the loss of public confidence in administrative agencies all militate against the maintenance of a dual system of determining the Issues
in rate cases." Id. at 267-68, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
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ministrative decision without completely disregarding it. This form of
review by certiorari is more than adequate to prevent capricious administrative action and can insure compliance with procedural due
process. The only difference is that the courts, rather than determining
if the "correct" or "optimum" rate was reached, defer to the expertise
of the rate-making body and merely pass upon whether there was substantial evidence in the record to support the administrative agency's
decision.
The recent cases in New York indicate a desire to acknowledge the
demise of the Ben Avon doctrine. In other states a variety of patterns
have emerged. At least one state, Alaska, has flatly condemned the rule.2Another group of states, while perhaps paying lip service to the rule, have
either applied the substantial evidence or reasonableness tests in most
cases or exercised independent judgment only in extreme cases. 33 Finally,
there are those jurisdictions which have continuously followed Ben
Avon. 4 A few states, such as Texas, seem to have been inconsistent in
their approach, perhaps indicating some confusion over the application
and vitality of the rule.35 California has incorporated the Ben Avon
case into its statutes practically verbatim. G Nevertheless, the California
32. Keiner v. City of Anchorage, 378 P.2d 406 (Alas. 1963). "Although the Ben Avon
doctrine has never been expressly overruled, it no longer appears to have any vigor as a
principle of constitutional law." Id. at 409 n.6.
33. E.g., Simns v. Round Valley Light & Power Co., 80 Ariz. 145, 294 P.2d 378 (19S6);
Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 226 Ark. 225, 289 S.W.2d
668 (1956); In re Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 71 Idaho 476, 233 P.2d 1024 (1951); Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comn'n, 232 La. 446, 94 So. 2d 431
(1957); Minneapolis St. Ry. v. City of Minneapolis, 251 Minn. 43, 86 N.W.2d 657 (1937);
State ex rel. Rice v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 359 Mo. 109, 220 S.V.2d 61 (1949); State
Corp. Conm'n v. Mountain States Tel & TeL Co., 58 N.M. 260, 270 P.2d 6S5 (1954);
San Juan Coal & Coke Co. v. Santa F6, S. J. & N. Ry., 35 N.M. S12, 2 P.2d 305 (1931);
Mount Vernon Tel. Corp. v. Public Util. Conm'n, 163 Ohio St. 381, 127 N.E.2d 14 (1955);
United Elec. Rys. v. Kennelly, 80 R.I. 64, 90 A.2d 775 (1952).
34. E.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Bell Tel & Tel Co., 253 Ala. 1, 42
So. 2d 655 (1949); Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 205 Ga. 863,
55 S.E.2d 618 (1949); Sizemore v. Public Serv. Conm'n, 133 Ind. App. 51, 177 N.E.2d
743 (1961); Central Me. Power Co. v. Public Util. Conim'n, 156 'Ale. 295, 163 A.2d 762
(1960); Opinion of the justices to the House of Representatives, 328 Mass. 679, 106
N.E.2d 259 (1952); Pacific Tel & TeL Co. v. HIll, 229 Ore. 437, 365 P.2d 1021 (1961);
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comnm'n, 202 Tenn. 465, 304 S.W.2d
640 (1957); State ex rel Pac. Tel & Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Serv., 19 Wash. 2d
200, 142 P.2d 498 (1943).
35. Compare Mars v. Railroad Comm'n, 142 Tex. 293, 177 S.W.2d 941 (1944), with
Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 198 S.W2d 424 (1946).
36. See Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 1760 (West 1956).
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Supreme Court has taken pains to indicate that this does not require
de novo review of all questions of law and fact.37
The lower federal courts have not considered the doctrine very often in
recent years, perhaps because statutory provisions providing for review
of federal administrative action have become so thorough. Nevertheless,
at least one federal district court has recently indicated that the Ben Avon
case is of little significance today.38
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is clear, from the author's viewpoint, that the Ben Avon doctrine is
an undesirable one. It may be inferred that the Supreme Court concurs
in this judgment, since it has failed either to reaffirm or to follow it without some modification. Moreover, it has chosen to ignore Ben Avon altogether with remarkable frequency. Perhaps, as Professor Jaffe has
noted, the Court has "concluded that it would be wise to retain the case
in its armory of implements against the day when some exceptional situation might demand its application." 39 However, the Supreme Court is
not, and should not be, a depository of rusty weapons which can sporadically be requisitioned to slay unsuspecting litigants. The Supreme
Court should seize upon the first opportunity to repudiate the Ben Avon
doctrine or, at the very least, to clarify it in view of subsequent cases
that have eroded its impact. Absent an explicit repudiation, state courts
should follow the approach of the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court, and thus depart from the doctrine on the theory that it
has been overruled sub silentio.
37. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 41 Cal. 2d 354, 260 P.2d 70 (1953),
appeal dismissed per curiam, 346 U.S. 919 (1954). Colorado, which also has a statute requiring the exercise of independent judgment by the courts, also seems to have mitigated
this requirement by judicial fiat. See Public Util. Comm'n v. Northwest Water Corp., 168
Colo. 154, 451 P.2d 266 (1969).
38. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The
three judge district court noted that it is unclear whether Ben Avon would be "read today
as requiring a more intensive judicial scrutiny than is generally employed in judicial review of
agency decisions." Id. at 427 n.5.
39. Jaffe, supra note 4, at 984.

